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This thesis is intended to contribute to the Turkish armed forces’ development of 
a national doctrine for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).  CIMIC doctrine is an 
increasingly significant component of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and even 
combat operations. Since the end of the cold war era, the number of conflicts rose 
steadily, and internal conflicts became more salient to international peace and security. In 
addition, winning in the Clausewitzian sense —simply obtaining territory and/or political, 
economic, and social concessions—is now of less interest than winning “hearts and 
minds.” Thus, during a multilateral peacekeeping operation, whether UN or NATO, the 
lack of an overarching strategy of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) will undermine the 
overall effectiveness of the mission. 
Turkey is in a geo-political position to make a significant contribution to the 
stabilization of conflicts in its region, and recently developed a series of initiatives aimed 
at increasing its effectiveness in peacekeeping operations. And in May 2005 the Turkish 
armed forces began to develop a civil-military cooperation doctrine.  
This thesis is intended to make a contribution to that doctrine. The thesis 
compares NATO doctrine with British, Canadian, and U.S. doctrines, and particularly in 
relation to their implementation in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo.  The thesis argues 
that there are variations among the NATO-member doctrines that may negatively affect 
“compatibility, interchangeability, and commonality” issues in NATO operations. 
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A. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey undertook a stabilizing and 
regional-power role. Turkey has participated in thirty-one peacekeeping or peace-
enforcement operations, eight of which are ongoing.1 Most of that participation was in 
NATO peace-enforcement and United Nations peacekeeping operations  
Turkish contributions to date have been limited to military forces: an infantry 
brigade in Korea, headquarters personnel in Concordia, Macedonia, and F-16 warplanes 
in Bosnia. However, the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences show that the use of military 
forces only is not always the best solution to a problem.  
Modern peacekeeping is a civil-military activity.  United Nations peacekeeping 
operations that took place between 1948 and 1988 were generally more limited in scope. 
Typically these involved the supervision of cease-fires between states that had consented 
to external verification. In the early 1990s peacekeeping became multidimensional, 
including more civilian programs that range from the observation of elections to the 
provision of humanitarian help. Military forces that were once concerned only with 
military issues in a post-conflict environment began to carry out missions in close 
cooperation and coordination also with civilian actors. As a consequence, civil-military 
cooperation (CIMIC) became a sine qua non of peace operations. 
Although peace operations include civil-military cooperation, Turkey could not 
make a substantial contribution to this aspect of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement 
operations  
                                                 
1 These are the Korean War, UNIMOG (Iraq-Iran), UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait), UNIMOG (Georgia), 
UNTAET-UNMISET (East Timor), UNMIBH (Bosnia), TIPH (El-Halil), EUPF (Bosnia), PROXIMA 
(Macedonia), SHARP GUARD (Bosnia), DENY FLIGHT (Bosnia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia), IFOR 
(Bosnia), SFOR (Bosnia), OPERATION HOPE (Somalia), ALBA (Albania), NATO AIR/SEA 
OPERATION IN KOSOVO, AFOR (Albania), KFOR (Kosovo), ESSENTIAL HARVEST (Macedonia), 
AMBER FOX (Macedonia), ALLIED HARMONY (Macedonia), EU CONCORDIA (Macedonia), ISAF-I 
(Afghanistan), ISAF-II (Afghanistan), ISAF-III (Afghanistan), ISAF-IV (Afghanistan EU PROXIMA), 
ISAF-V (Afghanistan), ISAF-VI (Afghanistan), ISAF-VII (Afghanistan) (Challenges of the Peacekeeping 
Operations in the 21st Century, Buenos Aires, May 25, 2005). 
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Today even the most powerful nations seek the help of others to defeat threats 
posed by both state and non-state actors. Solutions to global conflicts are provided by 
international and regional organizations like the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU). According to the Turkish 
concept of an appropriate distribution of forces in international peace operations, the 
priorities for participation are NATO-, EU-, UN-, and Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-led operations. Also according to that concept, the 
regional priorities in terms of operations are the Balkans, Caucasia, and Central Asia, the 
Middle East, and then other regions. Recent instability in Kosovo, Macedonia, and 
Bosnia in the Balkans; in Iraq, Israel, and Palestine in the Middle east; in Azerbaijan and 
Georgia in Caucasia; and in Uzbekistan in Central Asia has shown that Turkey must 
always be ready to contribute to stabilization in both the current and possible future 
conflicts in those regions, because any instability in the places mentioned above affects 
the interests of Turkey negatively. 
B. WHAT SHOULD TURKEY’S CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 
STRATEGY BE AND HOW SHOULD IT BE STRUCTURED? 
Having realized the importance of contributing to stabilization in conflict 
situations in its own geographical region, Turkey recently started a series of workshops to 
determine how the Turkish Republic can contribute more effectively to peacekeeping 
operations. One of the questions considered was, how should Turkey’s national civil-
military cooperation strategy be structured? The workshop participants included 106 
representatives from the Turkish general staff headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The workshop was held May 25–27, 2005, in Ankara, Turkey’s capital city.2 
After evaluating lessons learned from past and current peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement operations in which Turkey participated, the participants decided that, to be 
more effective in peace operations, the Turkish armed forces need a  CIMIC doctrine. 
doctrine. This doctrine should be prepared in keeping with the Turkish armed forces’ 
civil-military concept and in light of the lessons learned from previous peace operations. 
The seminar also stressed that the doctrine should take into consideration the issue of  
                                                 
2 Results of “How Should the National Civil Military Cooperation Strategy and the Structure Be?” 
Workshop, May 27, 2005. 
 3
interoperability, which the NATO CIMIC doctrine emphasizes is a task that NATO 
countries must take into consideration during the development and procurement of 
CIMIC capabilities. 
This thesis is intended to contribute to the Turkish armed forces’ development of 
a national CIMIC doctrine. To do this, the thesis first discusses Kosovo as a case study. I 
will then compare the doctrines of three NATO-member countries that contributed to the 
peace operations in Kosovo and Bosnia: Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. 
Using the NATO CIMIC doctrine as a framework, I will compare NATO CIMIC doctrine 
as a framework and will compare the British, Canadian, and U.S. doctrines to the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine. Finally, the thesis makes recommendations for the development of a 
new Turkish CIMIC doctrine.  
The thesis has four chapters. In this chapter, I explain my reasons for choosing 
this thesis topic. Chapter II discusses the evolving meaning of civil-military cooperation, 
the terminology of civil-military cooperation, the differences and relation between the 
various terms used by some countries and organizations, and the overall purpose of civil-
military cooperation. Next, I will present the overall role of CIMIC in peacekeeping 
operations. And, finally, using Kosovo and Bosnia as case studies, I will examine the 
CIMIC lessons learned from the Kosovo and Bosnia experiences. 
In Chapter III, I will compare the British, Canadian, and U.S. civil-military-
operations doctrines, using the NATO CIMIC doctrine as a framework. The comparison 
will include these aspects: 
• CIMIC core functions 
• Relation to associated activities 
• The principles of CIMIC 
• Application of CIMIC 
• The coordination and use of civil resources 
• Organization and command and control of CIMIC/CMOs forces 
• Civilian dimension of CIMIC 
• CIMIC centers, civil-military coordination centers, and civil-military 
operations centers. 
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The final chapter will make recommendations for the development of a new 
Turkish CIMIC doctrine in light of the lessons learned from Kosovo and my comparison 
of the NATO, British, Canadian, and U.S. doctrines. 
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II. THE EVOLVING MEANING OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
COOPERATION 
Nothing creates more misunderstanding, generates more emotion, and 
results in more confusion in modern peacekeeping than the subject of 
civil-military relations; yet nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important 
to successful peacekeeping in the new millennium than the cooperation 
and coordination between the principal contributors to a peacekeeping 
mission, military and nonmilitary. 
    David Lightburn 
    Challenges for the Operations of Twenty-first Century 
    Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During peacekeeping operations, whether they are UN or NATO operations, the 
lack of an overarching strategic civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) plan will decrease the 
overall effectiveness of the mission.  A strategic CIMIC plan presupposes a common 
understanding of civil-military cooperation, yet different CIMIC definitions and 
terminology are provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
European Union (EU), and individual nations. The harsh reality of the NATO Bosnia and 
Kosovo experience shows that a lack of coordination between different members of the 
Alliance was a major strategic problem. As Olga Oliver and colleagues argue, the lack of 
a common terminology has often led to misunderstandings, and even distrust, in 
peacekeeping operations.3 In this chapter, I argue that, for a more effective peacekeeping 
operation, each NATO-member country should have a unified civil-military cooperation 
doctrine that uses the same terminology as all the other member countries for the same 
purposes. Otherwise, each country will pursue its own national agenda, even while acting 
under the authority of NATO. 
This chapter has three parts. Part one gives an overall idea about how different 
countries and different organizations perceive the concept of civil-military cooperation. 
The second part discusses the purpose of civil-military cooperation, the reasons it is 
                                                 
3 Olga Oliker et. al., Aid During Conflict: Interaction between Military and Civilian Assistance 
Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001-June 2002 (Santa Monica, CA: 2004), 5.  
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necessary in peacekeeping operations, and its role in peacekeeping operations. Part three 
uses Kosovo and Bosnia as case studies, focusing on the civil-military cooperation 
lessons learned from those NATO peacekeeping operations, and provides 
recommendations for improving civil-military cooperation in future operations.  
B. THE TERMINOLOGY OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 
Colonel William R. Philips, who worked as the chief of the civil-military 
cooperation section in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), argues 
that “NATO’s perception of civil-military cooperation reflects the Alliance’s broad 
approach to security coupled with the recognition that there are civil ramifications to a 
military operation.”4 Many of the CIMIC perceptions of different countries reflect the 
same idea. However, many countries and organizations have slightly different definitions 
for CIMIC. This divergence in national and organizational approaches is due in part to 
different nations and organizations being involved in different types of military 
commitments in the last fifty years, and in part to different conceptions of their own 
interests in peacekeeping.5 Whereas NATO, as an organization, consider civil-military 
cooperation as “observation, interposition, and transition assistance,” the British perceive 
CIMIC as “direct assistance by conventional troops,” and Americans recognize the it as 
“force protection, liaison, and limited direct support “(see Figure 1).6  
                                                 
4 Colonel William R. Philips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in 
Bosnia, NATO Review, Vol. 46, Spring 1998, 22. 
5 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” In Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 119. 
6 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” In Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 119. 
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Figure 1.   National CIMIC Perspectives 
 
According to its military policy on civil-military cooperation, NATO, for 
example, defines CIMIC as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the 
mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national populations 
and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental 
organizations and agencies.”7 From NATO’s perspective, there is an emphasis on the 
importance of the military mission. 
The British doctrine also stresses the military side of civil-military cooperation. 
According to the UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-90, CIMIC is “the process whereby the 
relationship between the military and the civilian sectors is addressed with the aim of 
enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or 
international objectives.”8 
The European Union’s definition of civil-military cooperation in  EU-led crisis-
management operations is  similar to NATO’s: “the coordination and cooperation, in 
support of the mission, between military components and  civil actors which are external 
                                                 
7 “NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-Operation,” http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-
e.htm, (accessed May 2, 2005). 
8 UK Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 2003, G -1. 
National CIMIC 
Perspectives 
NATO: Observation; interposition; Transition 
U.S.: Force Protection; Liaison; Limited Direct Support
UK: CIMIC by conventional troops 
Canada: Systems Approach 
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to the EU, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, 
national, and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”9 
Unlike NATO, the EU, and UK, Canada has two definitions, one for the domestic 
environment, and the other for international environments.10 
1. CIMIC in the Domestic Environment 
“In peace, emergencies, or crisis, the resources and arrangements which support  
the relationship between CF commanders and Canadian federal, provincial, and 
municipal levels of government, and civil populations in an area where CF elements are 
stationed, or deployed, employed and supported. Such measures could include 
cooperation and coordination of activities between CF commanders and non-
governmental, national, and international agencies, organizations, and civil authorities.” 
2. CIMIC in an International Environment 
“In peace, emergencies, crisis or war the resources and arrangements which 
support the relationship between Task Force Commanders (TFCs) and foreign national 
authorities, military, paramilitary, as well as civil populations and foreign national 
governments in an area where TF elements are or plan to be deployed, employed and 
supported. Such measures would also include cooperation and coordination of activities 
and operations between TFCs and non-governmental and international agencies, 
organizations, and civil authorities.” 
As can be understood from the different definitions, CIMIC is simply the 
coordination and cooperation between civilians and the military. However, CIMIC is not 
only military assistance to civil authorities.11 That takes place only when military forces are 
called upon by a civil authority to conduct a particular mission because they don’t have the 
necessary means but the military does. The tasks can range from filling sandbags to 
                                                 
9 “CIMIC Concept for EU-Led Crisis Management Operations,” http://www.assemblee-
ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinares/rpt/2000/1689.pdf, (accessed May 2, 2005). 
10 “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War,” Canadian CIMIC Doctrine, 
http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/pages/j7doc_docdetails_e.asp?docid=17, (accessed April 3, 2005). 
11 Military Civic Action (MCA) is a form of CIMIC and it involves activities intended to win support 
of the local population for the military and for the foreign nation civilian leadership. MCA may include 
hiring local labor or working with paramilitary forces and is planned as short term projects with the long 
term goal of fostering national development. (Canadian CIMIC Doctrine, 2-13). 
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preventing flooding to earthquake relief. In carrying out such missions the military has a 
finite mission for a finite time and operates under civil direction throughout.12 Although, 
overall, CIMIC planning includes civil emergency planning (CEP),13 which concerns the 
protection of the local civilian population, CIMIC is not merely CEP.14 Nor is it civil 
affairs, nation building, or, by itself, a civil-military operation (CMO), although it may be 
apart of a CMO. 
Given the various national and organizational definitions of a central CIMIC 
concept cited above, for how long, we might ask, have countries been guided by a CIMIC 
concept? The simplest answer is, undoubtedly, that civil-military cooperation has existed 
as long as there has been war. In earlier times, however, commanders thought less about 
civil-military cooperation and more about simply war. As a result CIMIC was seen as 
little more than a logistic challenge. Before the collapse of the bi-polar world order, 
belligerents were overly dependent on the two nuclear powers and conflicts were mainly 
inter-state conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War era, not only has the number of 
conflicts increased, but also the nature of conflicts has changed from inter-state to intra-
state. However, the reality is that recent intra-state conflicts turned from a Clausewitzian 
way of winning, simply obtaining territory or political, economic, and social concessions, 
to a new way winning the hearts and minds of people.15.To end recent civil wars, other 
countries intervened, which increased the need for a more coordinated relationship 
between civilians and military personnel. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali argued that “only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying social, 
cultural, and humanitarian problems can place an enforced peace on durable 
foundations.”16 The new reality of an interventional global policy requires the 
involvement of considerably more contact between international armed forces and 
                                                 
12 J. W. Rollins, “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crisis Response Operations: The 
Implications for NATO,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2001, 127. 
13 According to the NATO CIMIC Doctrine CEP is concerned with the protection of and support to 
domestic populations, usually in the context of disasters or war. 
14 J. W. Rollins, “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crisis Response Operations: The 
Implications for NATO,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2001, 127. 
15 Max G. Manwaring, “Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia,” Parameters, Winter 1998, 28. 
16 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), 11. 
 10
humanitarian actors, an interaction that is described as civil-military cooperation 
(CIMIC). Consequently, such cooperation and the CIMIC organization designed to 
facilitate this cooperation, became a vital “front-line asset.17 Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) has become a key policy and an operational issue for all involved actors. 
Although there were attempts to define the term following NATO’s involvement in 
Bosnia, the implementation of CIMIC as a concept was not formalized by NATO until it 
was introduced as a command function as J-9 in 1998.18 Besides this, Gerald 
Hatzenbichler argues that civil military cooperation was defined by NATO in 1997 as 
derived from the U.S. Civil Affairs concept and that NATO’s experience in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.19 But it is for sure that prior to the Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR) 
deployment, NATO civil-military activities were narrow in scope and CIMIC operations 
were generally regarded as “rear area” activities associated with host-nation logistic 
support or the alleviation of displaced person interference with military operations.20 
C. DIFFERENCES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TERMS: CIVIL 
MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC), CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
(CMOS), CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) AND CIVIL MILITARY 
COORDINATION (CMCOORD) 
To avoid confusion, a clear distinction must be made between the terms that 
different organizations use for similar kinds of activities.  
1. Civil-Military Coordination (CMCooRD)  
Civil-military coordination is the term used by the United Nations to define a 
system of interaction that involves the exchange of information, negotiation, de-
confliction, mutual support, and planning at various levels between military elements and 
                                                 
17 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation” in Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 120. 
18 Larry Jenkins, “A Cimic Contribution to Assessing Progress in Peacekeeping Operations,” 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 10, No. 3, Autumn 2003, 124. 
19 Gerald Hatzenbichler, “Civil Military Cooperation in UN Peace Operations Designed by 
SHIRBRIG,” International Peace Keeping, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2001, 121. 
20 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” In Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 120. 
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humanitarian organizations, developmental organizations, and  the local civilian 
population to achieve respective objectives.21 
2. Civil-Military Operation (CMO) 
Civil-military operation is a comprehensive term that describes the general 
activities that a military force conducts.22 According to the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Civil-
Military Operations, JP 3-57, CMOs are “the activities of a commander that establish, 
maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace.”23 
3. Civil Affairs (CA)  
Civil affairs is the long-standing term that the U.S. military uses to describe its 
relations with the “other” – the civilian – realm. However, this term is often confused 
with the term “civil affairs activities.” Civil affairs are designated for active and reserve 
component forces and units trained to conduct civil affairs activities that support civil-
military operations. Civil affairs activities are activities performed by Civil Affairs 
personnel that24 enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities 
in areas where military forces are present. The activities include, for example, the 
application of civil-affairs functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility 
of the civil government, to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (See the U.S. 
Civil Affairs Doctrine)25 
Although the terms CMCooRD and CIMIC, CA or CMO refer to similar 
activities, there is a clear distinction between them. Colonel Philips, former chief of 
CIMIC at NATO headquarters, SHAPE, points out that the essence of CIMIC is support 
                                                 
21 “UN Civil-Military Coordination Standard Generic Training Module (SGTM),” 
http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/SGTM%20v%201.1/B-%20Training%20Material/C-
%20UN%20Issues/10%20%20UN%20Civil-Military%20Coordination.doc, (accessed May 26, 2005). 
22 Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 483 (accessed June 13, 2005). 
23 U.S. Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57, 1-1. 
24 To add to the confusion, Civil Affairs is used to define civil administrative activities by the UN. 
25 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed May 6, 
2005). 
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of NATO commanders in the accomplishment of their mission.26 Larry Minear, Ted van 
Baarda, and Marc Sommers argue that CIMIC is a “combat support operation” with a 
military aim, although many aid agencies remain unaware of that. This means that the 
framework through which NATO militaries interface with humanitarian organizations 
remains essentially military in character, even in the absence of active combat”.27 
Mochaitis supports the argument above and recognizes CIMIC as the military side of 
CMOs.28 In addition to the arguments about finding a place for CIMIC in CMOs, 
according to the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, all CA activities fall under the 
category of “support to CMO.”29 (See Figure 3.) The term “civil-military cooperation” 
refers specifically to cooperation between military units on the one hand and civilian 
institutions (including humanitarian organizations) on the other, but the U.S. term “civil-
military operation” includes a broad range of activities, including civil-military 
cooperation. Given all the above definitions, it can be said that “civil-military operation” 
is a broader term that includes civil affairs and CIMIC, because CMOs range from 
support to combat operations to traditional nonmilitary roles assisting countries in 
bringing about political, economic, and social stability.30 (See Figures 2 and 3.) 
                                                 
26 Colonel William R. Philips, Chief, Civil- Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in 
Bosnia, NATO Review, Vol. 46, Spring 1998, 22. 
27 Larry Minear et. al., “NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis,” 
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/OP36.pdf, (accessed October 26, 2005). 
28 Thomas Mockaitis, Telephone Interview with the Author, June 1, 2005. 
29 Jeffrey A. Jacobs, Civil Affairs in Peace Operations, Military Review, July-August 1998, 11. 
30 U.S. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/dod/docs/encym_p.pdf, (accessed 
July 16, 1997). 
 13
 
Figure 2.   Civil Military Operations Relationship31 
 
 
Figure 3.   Range of Civil Military Operations32 
 
                                                 
31 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57.1,” Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs,” April 14, 2003, I-7. 
32 U.S. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/dod/docs/encym_p.pdf, (accessed 
July 16, 1997). 
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Having found a place for CIMIC and CA under CMOs, the United Nations’ 
version of those terms, CMCoord, can now be put in a different category. The primary 
difference between CMCoord and the other concepts is that, in the UN context the 
military is part of an integrated mission structure under the overall civilian control of a 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG.)33 But CIMIC and Civil Affairs 
personnel work for the joint task commander in the operations. Unlike the SRSG, for 
example, in a NATO operation, the commander has no political authority at the 
operational level, and, as a consequence alliance commanders are to directly establish 
relations with civilian entities or individuals.34 For this reason, while UN-Centric 
CMCooRD is humanitarian focused, NATO-centric CIMIC functions are military 
focused (see Figure 4).  






















Figure 4.   Overlapping Areas of Concern for CIMIC, CA, CMOs and CMCooRD 
 
                                                 
33 “UN Civil-Military Coordination Standard Generic Training Module (SGTM),” 
http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/SGTM%20v%201.1/B-%20Training%20Material/C-
%20UN%20Issues/10%20%20UN%20Civil-Military%20Coordination.doc, (accessed May 6, 2005). 
34 Gerald Hatzenbichler, “Civil Military Cooperation in UN Peace Operations Designed by 
SHIRBRIG,” International Peace Keeping, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2001, 117. 
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D. PURPOSE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 
The military normally plays a supporting role during a civil crisis. Rather than 
taking the lead it helps relief agencies provide assistance. As a matter of fact, both the 
military and civilians prefer that the military only do the jobs of civilians in exceptional 
cases when, due to the security conditions, no civilian agency can do the job quickly 
enough or well enough. 
As noted in the Canadian CIMIC definition, its purpose is two-fold. The short-
term purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full cooperation of both the 
commander in chief of the operation and the civilian authorities, organizations, and 
population within the area of responsibility to help him to fulfill his mission. The long-
term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the 
achievement of operational objectives.35  
E. WHY DO WE NEED CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION? 
In the 1990s, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his “An Agenda 
for Peace,” implied that modern peacekeeping followed a sequence of conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping and peace-building. However, in today’s 
operations, it is hardly possible to say that there is such a clear sequence. In today’s 
peacekeeping all those events often take place simultaneously. And, in addition to them, 
during recent conflicts, humanitarian assistance was often required; and the military, 
most of the time, found itself contributing to humanitarian assistance, although that is not 
its primary job.36 In supporting the activities that are mentioned in “An Agenda for 
Peace,” military forces now play key roles in various peace-building activities, such as 
refugee returns, disarmament, de-mining, the custody and possible destruction of 
weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, 
monitoring elections, and advancing efforts to protect human rights.37 
                                                 
35 “NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-Operation,” http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-
e.htm, (accessed May 2, 2005). 
36 Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century--Concluding Report 1997-2002, 
http://www.peacechallenges.net/pdf/Concluding1.pdf, 144, (accessed January 2005). 
37 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Boutros Boutros 
Ghali, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html, (accessed May 12, 2005). 
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The complexity of the interdependence between civilian and military 
organizations makes coordination and cooperation a sine qua non of peace operations. 
For example, even a refugee-return issue can involve up to twelve different organizations 
and agencies.38 This is only one of the many complex issues that needed to be 
coordinated. Particularly the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo crises have clearly shown 
that the success of many peacekeeping operations is widely dependent on CIMIC 
activities.39 Civil-military cooperation provides a bridging mechanism between the 
intervention force on the one side and the relief organizations and civil institutions on the 
other. CIMIC operates as a force multiplier, making it possible for a significantly smaller 
deployment to have the same or greater effect than a larger one. 40,41,42 It is certain that 
CIMIC can be a very effective force multiplier.. However, reiterating this issue during the 
coordination between civilian institutions, especially NGOs, can result in a bad situation. 
NGOs don’t want to be seen as an asset of the military because that affects their 
impartiality and neutrality towards the civilian population.43,44,45 
In the NATO mission in Kosovo, the British contributed the smallest dedicated 
CIMIC unit, which only comprised 12 people.46 If it were not for the brigade 
commander’s proclamation that “CIMIC is every soldier’s job,”47 such a small 
                                                 
38 Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century--Concluding Report 1997-2002. 
http://www.peacechallenges.net/pdf/Concluding1.pdf, 145, (accessed January 2005). 
39 “Principles of the Civil-Military Cooperation Activities,” 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/diger_konular/sivilasker/prensipleri.htm (Official Website of Turkish General 
Staff, accessed May 1, 2005). 
40 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf (accessed May 12, 
2005). 
41 “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian CIMIC Doctrine,” 
http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/pages/j7doc_docdetails_e.asp?docid=17, (accessed April 3, 2005). 
42 UK Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 2003, 3-1. 
43 Thomas Mockaitis, Telephone Interview with the Author, June 1, 2005. 
44 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, April 14, 2003, VII-32. 
45 The Military Contribution to Peace Operations, UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, June 2004, B-4. 
46 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed May 12, 
2005). 
47 Ibid, 24. 
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commitment would suggest that the British aren’t aware of the importance of civil-
military cooperation. However, the British commander understands that CIMIC is his job, 
while the American commander, according to Mockaitis, behaves as if civil affairs are 
not his primary responsibility, and the French commander openly declares that he cannot 
perform his duties without the CIMIC unit.48 




Figure 5.   Crisis Stabilization49     
 
Figure 5 illustrates an idealized relationship between military and civilian 
organizations in crisis stabilization. The military is made responsible for activities “above 
the line,” while civilian organizations are responsible for activities “below the line.” 
However, reality has proven to be very different than Figure 5. Most peacekeeping 
operations have shown that military forces not only become involved in the lifesaving 
and life-support stages of a crisis, but also in all the areas that forces operate in the 
bottom section of the figure. Even though CIMIC is not normally involved in 
                                                 
48 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed May 12, 
2005). 
49 Ibid., 124. 
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humanitarian aid projects, in Bosnia, according to the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace (GFAP), one of the main tasks of the CIMIC units was to help people to return to 
their pre-war homes.50 For example, in 1997, the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) for 
Bosnia had to support the efforts of the civil society in repatriation, reconstruction, 
capital investment projects, municipal elections, and civil-institution building.51 
William T. Johnson from the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute argues that 
“Civil and military leaders must understand that strict adherence solely to overseeing the 
military provisions of the peace agreement (Bosnia) is shortsighted and actually could 
prolong the need for an outside military presence.”52 Indeed the peace treaty itself 
includes the mission of helping the UNHCR and other international organizations in their 
humanitarian missions.53 Besides this, military should support the reconstruction of the 
society anyway by all means because, if the efforts for these kind of activities fail, the 
military mission can fail as well. 
If we accept that military involvement in areas of civilian responsibility is 
inevitable, how far should it go? Figure 654 illustrates what has now become accepted 
policy by many countries. According to this policy, as the civil organizations and local 
authorities “get up and running,” there should be a corresponding decline in military 
involvement.55  
                                                 
50 Capt. Constantin Spinu, Nordpol CIMIC: Hope for the Winter, SFOR Informer #155, January 9, 
2003, http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/155/p08a/t02p08a.htm, (accessed May 12, 2005). 
51 Colonel William R. Philips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in 
Bosnia, NATO Review, Vol. 46, Spring 1998, 22. 
52 William T. Johnson, “U.S. participation in IFOR: A Marathon not a Sprint,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, June 20, 1996), 27. 
53 GFAP Annex 1-A, Article VI (Cited in Jeffrey A. Jacobs, Civil Affairs in Peace Operations, 
Military Review, July-August 1998, 16). 
54 J. W. Rollins, “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crisis Response Operations: The 
Implications for NATO,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2001, 124. 
55 Ibid., 125. 
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Figure 6.   Civil Related Activities in Crisis Stabilization56 
 
The European policy notes that “In exceptional circumstances the military forces 
may be required to carry out tasks which are normally the task of a mandated civil 
authority, organization or agency. But, these tasks should only be executed when 
authorized in the operation plan (OPLAN) and when the appropriate civil body is not 
present or is unable to carry out its job and if an unacceptable vacuum would otherwise 
arise. The military force should be prepared to undertake these tasks when requested by 
the recognized civil authority, until assumed by the civil authority, organization, or 
agency.”57 
G. CIMIC IN KOSOVO AND BOSNIA 
The NATO experience in Kosovo provides a good example of the civilian 
community’s worldview, reflecting their preferred mode of interaction with the military 
in humanitarian emergencies.58 In Kosovo, there were five multinational brigades 
(MNB), each of which had its own unit to deal with civil-military coordination and 
                                                 
56  J. W. Rollins, “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crisis Response Operations: The 
Implications for NATO,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2001, 125. 
57 “CIMIC Concept for EU-Led Crisis Management Operations,” http://www.assemblee-
ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinares/rpt/2000/1689.pdf, (accessed May 2, 2005). 
58 Olga Oliker et. al., Aid During Conflict: Interaction between Military and Civilian Assistance 










cooperation. In Bosnia during SFOR and IFOR there were three multinational divisions 
(MND) and in those divisions most of the battalions had their own CIMIC units to carry 
out the coordination with the civilians. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Bosnia Maps (From: KFOR Map from OSCE 
ftp.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia.html (accessed May 6, 2005) 
 
In Kosovo MNB East and in Bosnia MND North “Tactical Support Teams (TST)” 
did the CIMIC. Both in Kosovo and Bosnia the teams were given areas of responsibility 
that allowed the same soldiers to visit the same villages, neighborhoods, and other places 
repeatedly.59 Sending the same persons to the same area over and over served to build 
trust relationships and allowed team members to better evaluate the situation. Tactical 
support teams were always in contact with the local people, international organizations 
(IO), and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel and were doing a very good 
job, although their number was small.  
Tactical support teams (TST) consisted of four to six people (an officer- grade 
team leader, usually a major; one or two other officers; three sergeants; and an 
                                                 
59 Larry Wentz, Civil-Military Operations, 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, (accessed May 17, 2005). 
SFOR Deployment in Bosnia KFOR Deployment in Kosovo 
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interpreter). The teams traveled in a two- to three-vehicle convoy. They used high- 
performance radios, GPS receivers and palms, and laptops. In Kosovo, the activities of 
the CIMIC units, the civil affairs personnel, and the tactical support teams were 
coordinated at the twelve CIMIC centers located in different regions of Kosovo. In 
Bosnia, CIMIC centers operated in each of the multinational divisions where there was a 
demonstrated need and available resources.60 These centers were intentionally located 
outside the military compounds to show respect for the neutrality and impartiality of the 
NGOs. But it is generally understood that, when military forces enter an area before the 
arrival of IOs and NGOs, the coordination centers (CIMIC Centers) should be established 
by the military. If military forces enter an area after the arrival of IOs and NGOs, the 
military should use the existing center of those organizations (for example, a UN 
humanitarian operations center) to coordinate as necessary.61  
1. Coordination  
a. Coordination at the Mission Headquarters Level 
In Kosovo, there were twelve CIMIC centers, in different parts of Kosovo 
to coordinate the CIMIC activities (see Figure 8). 
 
                                                 
60 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” In Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 119. 
61 “NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine June 2003,” 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf, (accessed 12 May 2005), 5-3. 
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Figure 8.   KFOR CIMIC Centers  
 
Although these centers were working very well separately, there was no 
strategic “CIMIC plan”62 to coordinate all the activities at the mission level.63,64 As a 
                                                 
62 According to the Canada’s CIMIC Doctrine, a CIMIC plan is “a cooperative civil-military venture 
aimed at selecting and implementing a coherent course of action which will achieve mission objectives and 
the desired end state.” According to NATO Doctrine, the CIMIC Plan is “normally an annex to the 
Operation Order (OPORD).The plan is based on an assessment of the operational area. This assessment 
should cover such areas as political and cultural history of the affected area: state of the government, public 
administration and services: the media: the industrial, agricultural, and economic capacity of the region: 
and the involvement, capability, and structure of international organizations and NGOs operating in the 
area. 
63 Christopher Holshek, “The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of 
Effort,” http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 285 (accessed May 12, 2005). 
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consequence, CIMIC policies at the multinational-brigade (MNB)65 level were affected 
by national interests instead of the interests of the whole mission (see Figure 1).66 In 
Bosnia, during the development of the IFOR Operational Plan, it was reported that there 
was only one civil affairs officer assigned to assist the deployment of IFOR.67 As a result, 
the campaign plan not only inadequately identified military tasks for CIMIC, but also 
negatively affected CIMIC deployment, manning, and logistics requirements. Besides 
this, early on in the IFOR deployment, it became clear that there was a disconnection 
among the multinational divisions. In addition, national contingents often sought to 
involve NGOs or government-sponsored relief agencies from their own countries or 
regions instead of treating UNHCR as the designated lead agency. Beyond an 
inappropriate use of resources, this sort of favoritism affected the impartiality of the 
military. On the other hand, there were occasions when CA/CIMIC assistance was based 
on local politics rather than need.68 For example, the Germans’ desire to resettle Kosovo 
refugees from Germany took precedence over strategic considerations. 
The absence of a strategic plan was not limited to the NATO Kosovo 
Force (KFOR); UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) also lacked a strategic plan. A civil-
military cooperation plan was drafted during the first rotation of key staff. However, it 
was never really implemented.69 Many CIMIC officers did not even know that there was 
such a plan.70 For this reason, during rotations of forces, the passing of knowledge to the 
                                                 
64 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed May 12, 
2005). 
65 Kosovo was divided into five sectors and a lead nation from the members of the NATO alliance 
was assigned responsibility for each sector. For each sector, a Multinational Brigade (MNB) was 
established under Commander KFOR. The United States was responsible for MNB (East), the French for 
MNB (North), the Italians for MNB (West), the Germans for MNB (South) and the British for MNB 
(Central). 
66 Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 493 (accessed May 12, 2005). 
67 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” In Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 122. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 492 (accessed May 12, 2005). 
70 Ibid. 
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newcomers should be improved. This problem can be solved in two ways, either by 
overlapping the rotations (like the U.S. civil affairs) or by extending the rotation turns, at 
least at the CIMIC-unit level.71  
In the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, better 
known as the Brahimi Report, Lakhdar Brahimi calls for improved interagency 
coordination and integrated mission planning at the strategic level.72 He complains about 
the lack of integrated planning, or the existence of a support cell, at the strategic 
headquarters, involving those responsible for political analysis, military operations, 
civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights development, humanitarian assistance, 
refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance, and personnel 
recruitment, among others. He also states that there were no more than a handful of 
officers dedicated full-time to planning and support, even in the large complex 
operations, such as those in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Kosovo (UNMIK), and East 
Timor (UNTAET). As Brahimi says, there was no such integrated coordination in 
Kosovo. 
b. Coordination at the Peacekeeping Force Level 
As was mentioned earlier, the most important CIMIC problem in Kosovo 
was the absence of an overall civil-military cooperation strategy and campaign plan. For 
this reason, the CIMIC strategy in Kosovo became driven from the bottom up.73 Each 
multi- national brigade was carrying out civil-military cooperation missions individually 
and, at the end of the day, reporting what they had gathered to the higher headquarters. 
The G574 of the Kosovo MNB east led by United States, in his after-action report, wrote 
that tactical-level CIMIC activities within MNB east were hindered by the absence of an 
                                                 
71 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed May 12, 
2005). 
72 “Brahimi Report,” http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/, (accessed June 22, 2005). 
73 Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 493 (accessed May 19, 2005). 
74 According to US Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, February 
2003, “The G5/S5 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil military operations. The 
G5/S5 must enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the 
AO. The G5/S5 is required at all echelons from battalion through corps level, but authorized only at 
division and corps levels.” 
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overarching plan. And there was also a lack of means to measure the activities of the 
CIMIC units at the operational level.75 According to Lt. Col. Ben Klappe, from the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who worked as a company commander in 
KFOR, at the strategic level the measurement of effectiveness for CIMIC was directly 
related to the success of the overall military operation.76 However, at the operational 
level each unit had its own way of doing the coordination. As a consequence, it was not 
possible to send SMART77 (specific, measurable, attainable, result-oriented, time-based) 
CIMIC feedback to the strategic headquarters, which could, in turn, affect the whole 
operation. 
While the Brahimi report emphasizes the importance of using information 
technology in such operations,78 in Kosovo a frequent problem was that the tactical 
support teams (TSTs) were often asked for information that they had previously reported 
to headquarters. It was obvious that the information gathered by the TSTs was not being 
reviewed, assessed, and distributed in such a way that others could access and use it.79 
The Brahimi report implies that a geographic information system was used for 
humanitarian assistance, whereas a CIMIC version of that system could be used to better 
coordinate the civil-military activities.80 
c. Humanitarian Coordination 
According to Larry Wentz, besides the KFOR troops, there were more 
than 650 separate international, nongovernmental, and other volunteer organizations in 
                                                 
75 According to US Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, February 
2003, “The G5/S5 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil military operations. The 
G5/S5 must enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the 
AO. The G5/S5 is required at all echelons from battalion through corps level, but authorized only at 
division and corps levels.” 
76 Lt. Col Ben Klappe, Personal Interview with the author, October 27, 2005. 
77 According to the British CIMIC Doctrine, p. 4.13, Measurement of Effectiveness (MOE) in CIMIC 
should be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Result-oriented, Time-based) and objective and 
comparable from occasion to occasion. 
78 “Brahimi Report,” http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/, 42 (accessed May 12, 2005). 
79 Christopher Holshek, “The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of 
Effort,” http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 305 (accessed June 6, 2005). 
80 Brahimi Report, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/, 43 (accessed August 13, 
2005). 
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Kosovo—an area the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut. And in Bosnia during IFOR, 
there were more than 530 NGOs in theater on the second day of the operation.81 The 
issue was not that there was not enough presence, but that they were uncoordinated.82  
Over the past ten years, the military understood that, due to their 
experience in humanitarian relief operations, some NGOs and IOs are better than the 
military in terms of coordinating these kinds of operations.83 While those organizations 
lead a relief operation, the military can coordinate events by sending liaison officers to 
lead the organizations. However, while coordinating with the organizations, one 
important factor should be kept in mind. There are many differences in the “modus 
operandi” of military versus civilian organizations.84  
While the military focuses on reaching clear objectives in a hierarchical 
command- and- control structure with a time line, civilian organizations usually try to do 
their jobs through bargaining, risk taking and consensus building. According to the 
NATO, British, and Canadian CIMIC doctrines, if it is used properly, CIMIC is accepted 
as a “force multiplier.” However, during the coordination, referring to this issue over and 
over may affect the coordination negatively, because civilian organizations don’t want to 
be seen as subordinate to the military objectives.85  For this reason, the liaison officers 
should pass CIMIC training before being sent to those organizations. Moreover, CIMIC 
staffs, who are planners at headquarters, should have very good CIMIC training. It is 
common knowledge that mistakes at the strategic level cannot be corrected by successes 
at the tactical level. For example, in KFOR and UNMIK, although there was not a 
coherent CIMIC plan that supported the whole operation at the strategic level, at the 
                                                 
81 James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation,” In Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (CCRP: January 1998), 121. 
82 Larry Wentz, Introduction, “Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, 12 (accessed May 12, 2005). 
83 Christopher Holshek, “The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of 
Effort,” http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, (accessed May 12, 2005). 
84 Ibid. 
85 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed May 12, 
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operational level there were some units, that were very successful in terms of CIMIC, like 
the British CIMIC units.86 However, overall, the civil-military cooperation in KFOR and 
UNMIK was not very effective, because, especially in military operations, a unit will act 
according to a plan drawn up at the joint-task force headquarters, like KFOR and 
UNMIK headquarters. In short, there should have been a strategic CIMIC plan in 
Kosovo. 
To have better coordination, another option may be the participation of 
key persons from major NGOs and IOs in courses held at the NATO school,87 or, to 
increase the effectiveness of the liaison officers to the civilian organization, tours of duty 
for these persons should be at least one year, and the overlapping period between the 
rotations should be as long as possible.  
2. Providing Vital Supplies 
At the very beginning of a conflict, if there is no alternative, the task of providing 
vital supplies to the local people can fall on the shoulders of the military. For example, in 
Skenderaj, in Kosovo, the MNB West set up a food and clothing distribution center. 
However, in that kind of situation, the military should avoid creating an overdependence 
on military assistance. In addition, the military should make known to the local people 
that the military cannot provide food and other vital supplies forever. As soon as  relief 
organizations come to the region, this issue should be coordinated with those 
organizations. 
3. Protecting Humanitarian Assistance 
Rather than undertaking relief operations, the military should protect the 
humanitarian assistance operations. In other words, as the International Committee for 
the Red Cross emphasizes, the military is most valuable in creating a “humanitarian 
space” within which aid agencies can operate.88,89 Besides this, as during the first months 
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of the Kosovo mission, a military intervention force must be prepared to assume police 
functions until a working civil police force can be formed.90 
4. Restoring Civil Structure 
Although restoring the civil structure is not a responsibility of the military, 
especially in the early phases of a conflict, this task falls on the military when there is no 
other option. In Kosovo, four pillars of the reconstruction were shared among different 
organizations. Humanitarian assistance was the responsibility of the UNHCR, civil 
administration was the responsibility of the UNCA (United Nations Correspondents 
Association), institution-building was the responsibility of OSCE, and economic 
reconstruction was the responsibility of the EU. Every organization tried to carry out their 
responsibilities, but there was a coordination problem, a job that was the responsibility of 
UNMIK. Overall, it is possible to say that, in terms of coordinating the reconstruction of 
the civil society, civil-affairs personnel were more active and effective than CIMIC units. 
This was normal because, in the task-definition of civil affairs there is a part that includes 
the application of civil-affairs specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of the 
civil government. For example, civil-affairs units coordinate with NGOs and the 
international community to provide adequate shelter, clean water, food, and medical 
assistance. In the area of civil administration, they helped UNCA establish multi-ethnic 
governmental structures to perform civil-service functions and public services such as 
sanitation and postal and fire services. They also coordinated utility repairs such as 
telephone, water, and power. In the area of institution-building, they have helped OSCE 
organize a judicial system, media development, the training of local administrators, and 
elections.91 While CAs were canalizing their efforts toward the coordination of nation-
building activities, some CIMIC units were doing a very good job. For example, in one 
Kosovo village, the Red Cross built a school and the brigade then added a playground. 
Brigade engineers have also provided running water for entire villages, repaired roads, 
                                                 
90 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Small Wars, May 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf, (accessed April 12, 
2005). 
91 Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, (accessed May 12, 2005). 
 29
and built bridges.92 Although NATO’s CIMIC doctrine requires commanders to seek to 
avoid the use of military assets on nonmilitary tasks (AJP-9, 2-2), in many cases it is 
necessary to use available military assets for the survival of the people. In Kosovo, 
German CIMIC teams were very active and effective in terms of reconstruction. This 
seems to be due to the long-time German experience in emerging civil-operations 
planning, under the wartime host-nation support concept of the cold war.93 They assisted 
in building over thirty schools and more than 960 houses, and were involved in more than 
350 projects, such as building roads and bridges. Besides this, their military field 
hospitals provided assistance for civil emergencies, while CIMIC personnel provided 
training for locals, such as teaching villagers how to repair tractors.94   
5. Confidence Building 
In Kosovo there were distinct differences between countries in the way they 
conducted their patrolling. While the British always sent the same soldiers to the same 
villages, with an emphasis on direct contact, the Americans over relied on armed vehicles 
and distanced the local population from the soldiers.95  
Because CIMIC units have direct contact with civilian populations, to “win the 
hearts and minds” of the local people it is necessary for CIMIC personnel to have certain 
special qualifications. They must not only possess political and cultural sensitivity, but 
also oral and written English-language communication skills.96 For example, because 
some MNB troops from contributing countries and Kosovo communities had cultural 
similarities, they experienced better communication. Kosovo people coming from a 
“high-context culture” obviously had some misunderstandings with U.S. personnel. For 
example, if a woman falls down, Turkish soldiers know that they shouldn’t touch her, 
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even to help. But in similar cases, Americans did not know this, just because they are 
from a different culture,97 a “low-context” culture. Within such cultures as Kosovo’s, 
personnel relationship-building must precede every event. If CIMIC personnel want to 
discuss an issue with the local people, first they must build confidence with them by, for 
example, drinking coffee together.  For example, on one occasion there was a conflict 
over what color to paint a youth center near Gjlan in Kosovo. An American officer got 
frustrated and forced the solution, then left, satisfied with having solved the problem, 
leaving others to spend the next month sorting out the mess.98 Especially in high-context 
cultures, before getting to the point, it is best to chat about trivial things and drink, for 
example, a cup of coffee, thereby building the confidence upon which civil-military 
cooperation depends.    
H. CIMIC LESSONS LEARNED FROM KOSOVO AND BOSNIA 
1. For CIMIC units to work more effectively, they should be equipped with 
information technology, like laptops, palm pilots, digital camcorders, 
GPS, and satellite communication assets. Besides this, the software that 
they use for information gathering should be the same for every unit, so 
that the information gathering, assessment, and distribution can be more 
effective.  
2. CIMIC units should not carry their weapons in a threatening way. If 
possible, they should use only side arms and avoid wearing their battle 
gear.  
3. The principle “CIMIC is every soldiers’ job” should be accepted by the 
force commander.  
4. If possible, some functional specialists should be integrated into the 
CIMIC units. 
5. CIMIC centers should be located outside the military zone: locations near 
the key civilian organizations can be good options.  
6. There should be a strategic CIMIC plan to coordinate activities at the 
tactical level. This can be made possible by networking the CIMIC centers 
in the field.  
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7. After every CIMIC activity, an after-action report should be filled out 
meticulously within twenty-four hours and sent back to headquarters. All 
the after-action reports should be reviewed by a trained CIMIC group, and 
if there are any contributions derived from the reports, they must be 
recorded as a CIMIC “lesson learned.” 
8. Tours of duty for troops from contributing countries should be 
standardized and no less than six months.99 Besides this, during 
replacements there should be at least a two-week overlapping period. 
9.   CIMIC personnel should be given more initiative so they can better 
coordinate events with the civilian organizations that work within the 
broad mission guidelines.100  
10.  Because, for civilian organizations, personal relationships and trust are 
common currency, rotation for CIMIC liaison officers to those 
organizations should be no less than twelve months. If this is not possible, 
during the rotations, the overlap period for these persons should be at least 
three weeks.  
11. To protect impartiality, the military contingent should treat all NGOs and 
other civilian organizations equally, including those that come from the 
military’s own country.101 
12. To ensure greater cooperation, the military should send coordination 
officers to the lead organizations and invite liaison personnel from those 
agencies to the joint permission planning. 
13.   During coordination between civilian agencies, to avoid 
misunderstandings, military personnel should avoid using the term “force 
multiplier” when talking about civil-military cooperation.102 
14. Until an effective police force can be established, the military force should 
also be prepared to carry out the police functions. For example, during the 
first months of the Kosovo mission there was a power vacuum, which led 
to some lawlessness and revenge-taking.103 
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15. In case of need, the military can lend its logistical engineering assets to an 
emergency relief effort. However, to avoid the dependency limitations of 
those, the lending period should be clear at the very beginning.104 
16. Personnel exchanges in which members of civilian and military 
organizations attend each other’s training courses could further enhance 
communication and cooperation during a conflict. 
17. Military forces should engage with civilian organizations as early as 
possible, so they can hand over some activities that should be done by 
civilian organizations as soon as possible.105 
18. CIMIC staff personnel working at the headquarters should have some 
CIMIC field experience.  
19. Securing areas where humanitarian assistance is delivered can only be 
carried out by the military. However, the peacekeeping forces that are 
performing security activities should not carry out relief operations at the 
same time.106 
20. Each CIMIC unit should be given a briefing about “low-context and high-
context cultures” before deployment into the field.  
21. CIMIC personnel should be informed about the complexity of refugee 
returns and be reminded of the social, economic, and psychological 
complexities of returns.107 
22. If some military assets can be used for humanitarian assistance, like water-
cleaning equipment that is sitting idle and not being used for a military 
purpose, those assets should be put into service by CIMIC units in case of 
demand. 
23. Countries that have conscription systems should review their skill profiles 
and select candidates who meet their CIMIC functional specialist 
needs.108 
24. Local educated people should be given a chance to contribute to CIMIC 
activities.  
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25. CIMIC personnel must possess not only peacekeeping experience but also 
political and cultural sensitivity, and English-language oral and written 
communication skills. In addition, they should possess some personal and 
facilitating skills.  
26. Rules for classifying information should be reevaluated by the military, 
because most of the time, when civilian organizations ask for information, 
they are turned down under the pretext of “classified information.” 
27. CIMIC personnel should honor the local leaders in the areas where they 
operate by inviting them to participate in coordination activities. 
28. Before the operation, representatives of Special Forces and CIMIC units 
should sit together and coordinate their overlapping activities.109 
29. In CIMIC activities noncommissioned officers (NCOs) should be used 
more effectively. 
30. NGOs should be briefed about the capabilities of the military, so that they 
don’t have an unrealistic picture, such as an assumption that the military 
can secure all their widely dispersed operations.110 
31. Excessive emphasis on force protection can reduce the credibility of the 
CIMIC units and this can hamper civil-military cooperation. 
32. If possible, former warring factions should be integrated into CIMIC 
projects.111 
33. Although CIMIC activities do not usually arouse media interests, they 
should be publicized effectively. 
34. Early deployment of CIMIC or Civil Affairs personnel in the theatre of 
operations can be very useful, setting the stage for the introduction of 
follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized 
interaction with the local people.112 
35. In operations in which the civil implementation of the overall objectives 
plays such a key role, Civil Affairs and CIMIC have an important, timely 
role to play.113 
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36. Since capital cities are on the spot in the world’s media, special CIMIC 
centers should be created just to deal with the implementation of civil 
projects in those cities. 
37. The Bosnia experience has shown that troop-contributing countries should 
provide CIMIC or Civil Affairs personnel in proportion to the number of 
troops they provide; otherwise, the headquarters will become overstaffed 
with CIMIC personnel. 
38. In the absence of functioning civil implementation institutions, a peace 
force receives more public pressure to take a larger role in the 
reconstruction of a society. 
39. During the rotation or transferring of forces, special attention should be 
given   to preserving valuable CIMIC turnover opportunities. 
40. Civilian entities should be educated on what the military will be doing, but 
the briefing should not be given only in the capital cities, but also in the 
field where a majority of the NGOs are located. 
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III. A COMPARISON OF THE CANADIAN, BRITISH, AND 
UNITED STATES CIVIL-MILITARY DOCTRINES TO NATO’S 
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
NATO defines “standardization” as the process of developing concepts, doctrines, 
procedures, and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of 
“compatibility, interchangeability and commonality” in the operational, procedural, 
materiel, technical, and administrative fields.114 To enhance the combined operational 
effectiveness of Alliance military forces in peacekeeping operations, members should 
have mutually agreeable doctrines and strategies 
Turkey is a troop-contributing member of NATO, but it does not yet have a 
national CIMIC doctrine. However, it is on the way to having one (see chapter 1). 
According to the findings of the recent workshop, in which military and civilian 
personnel from the Turkish armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated, 
Turkey should develop a national CIMIC doctrine that is compatible with the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine. The workshop participants also recommended that while developing this 
doctrine, Turkish armed forces members should study the CIMIC doctrines of the various 
NATO members. 
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States are also troop-contributing NATO 
members. Although NATO requires that Alliance-member policy documents be 
compatible with one another, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States all have 
CIMIC and CMO doctrines that differ slightly from the NATO civil-military cooperation 
doctrine.115 
This chapter is intended as a contribution to the Turkish armed forces’ 
development of a civil-military cooperation doctrine. It compares the British, Canadian, 
and U.S. doctrines, using NATO’s doctrine as a framework. The chapter shows that there 
are slight variations among NATO members’ doctrines, variations that may negatively 
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affect the “compatibility, interchangeability, and commonality” issues involved in NATO 
peacekeeping operations. During Turkey’s development of its national doctrine, it should 
take those variations into consideration. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will compare the civil-military 
cooperation doctrines of NATO, Canada, and Great Britain, and the civil-military 
operations doctrine of the United States. The comparison will be explored from a number 
of different perspectives; 
• CIMIC core functions 
• Associated activities  
• The principles of CIMIC  
• Application of CIMIC 
• The coordination and the use of the civil resources 
• Organization and command and control of CIMIC/CMOs forces 
• Civilian dimension of CIMIC 
• CIMIC centers, civil military coordination centers and CMO centers 
Part two of the chapter will evaluate the doctrine comparisons 
B. COMPARISON OF THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN CIMIC 
DOCTRINES AND THE U.S. CMO DOCTRINE TO THE NATO CIMIC 
DOCTRINE 
1. Core Functions 
NATO: NATO accepts 
• Civil-military liaison, 
• Support to the civil environment, and 
• Support to the force as core functions of the CIMIC.116 
The NATO doctrine also points out that having the tacit support of the population 
is as important as having the active support. For this reason, earning the support of the 
population can be counted as a fourth function of civil-military cooperation.117 
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Great Britain: Like the NATO doctrine, the British doctrine accepts  
• Liaison between the military and civilian agencies, 
• Support to the force, and 
• Support to the civilian environment as the core functions that civil-military 
cooperation requires.118 
United States: U.S. doctrine broadly separates CMO functions into; 
• Support to military operations and  
• Support to civil operations. 
But the doctrine mentions that, even though those functions seem separate, 
sometimes they become intertwined, depending on the nature of a particular operation 
and its potential to expand from a civil to a military mission.119  
Canada: Similar to the U.S. doctrine, according to the Canadian doctrine, there are 
two main CIMIC functions:  
• Civil-military cooperation operations, 
• Support to civil administrations. 
The Canadian doctrine studies the core functions of CIMIC within the framework 
of three scenarios:120 
• Operations in friendly territory  
• Operations in Hostile territory 
• Operations in Canadian territory 
The NATO, British, and U.S. doctrines, however, mainly focus on operations in 
the international arena; they do not differentiate the way the Canadian doctrine does. 
2. Activities Associated with Civil-Military Cooperation 
NATO: There are many activities that are closely associated with civil-military 
cooperation. According to the NATO doctrine, the most important ones are:121 
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• Military assistance in humanitarian emergencies 
• Civil emergency planning 
• Host-nation support 
Great Britain: Although civil-military cooperation involves interaction with all 
the sectors of a civilian community, according to the British doctrine, the interactions 
with nongovernmental and international organizations are the most demanding. For this 
reason, the British doctrine considers “humanitarian issues” as the main issue of civil-
military cooperation. It does not focus on other activities. 
Canada: The Canadian doctrine studies a broad range of associated activities in 
relation to civil-military cooperation:122 
• Military civil information 
• Host nation support 
• Population and resource control 
• Support to civil authorities and 
• Humanitarian assistance 
• Military civic action 
• Civil defense 
• Civil assistance 
• Support to civil administration 
United States: According to the U.S. doctrine, the main activities associated with 
civil-military operations are: 
• Populace and resource control 
• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) 
• Nation assistance operations other than FHA 
• Military civic action 
• Civil preparedness and emergency operations 
• Civil administration 
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• Domestic support operations 
• Military support to the civil authorities  
Unlike the NATO doctrine, the British, Canadian, and U.S. doctrines put special 
emphasis on the role of civil-military operations in counterinsurgency. According to the 
U.S. Joint Doctrine for counterinsurgency (U.S. JP 3-57), during a counterinsurgency 
operation the goal of civil-military operations is to isolate the insurgents from the 
populace, thus depriving them of recruits, resources, intelligence, and credibility.123 
3. The Principles of Civil-Military Cooperation  
NATO: The NATO doctrine separates the principles of CIMIC into two main 
groups:124  
• The principles governing the military direction of CIMIC and  
• The principles governing the civil-military relationship 
The principles governing the military direction of CIMIC are: 
• Mission primacy 
• Command direction 
• Economy  
• Prioritization and concentration 
• Legal obligations and humanitarian considerations  
The principles governing the civil-military relationship are: 
• Cultural awareness  
• Common goals 
• Shared responsibilities 
• Consent of the civilians  
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Great Britain: According to the British doctrine the principles guiding the 
CIMIC are:125 
• Legal obligations 
• Differentiated relationships  
• Cultural awareness  
• Cooperation 
• Understanding, respect, and trust 
• Mutual responsibility 
• Transparency 
• Communication 
• Situational awareness 
• Influence 
• Scale of effort 
• Transition management 
Canada: The Canadian doctrine enumerates the general principles of CIMIC as 
follows:126 
• Continuity and consistency of the policy  
• Selection and maintenance of the aim 
• Command responsibility  
• Trust and confidence 
• Cooperation 
• Mutual responsibility and support 
• Impartiality 
• Foresight 
• Economy of resources and effort 
• Humanitarian consideration 
• Force protection 
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United States: As parallel to the NATO’s principles of CIMIC, U.S. doctrine 
designates six principles for the CMO. These are 127 
• Mission  
• Command responsibility 
• Continuity and consistency of the policy 
• Reciprocal responsibilities 
• Economy of personnel and resources 
• Humanitarian considerations  
This overview of the various doctrines shows that they are all parallel in terms of 
their guiding principles, though some of the terminology varies from document to 
document. At bottom, they all reflect the basic principles of the NATO doctrine. 
Nonetheless, some points merit elucidation. Both NATO and Great Britain cite the 
principle of “transparency,” but the NATO doctrine includes a caveat: CIMIC personnel 
should work closely with intelligent assets to obtain the timeliest and accurate 
information that may be passed to the civilian organizations. It also asserts that CIMIC 
personnel will become ineffective if they are used for collecting intelligence.128 
The Canadian doctrine, while it details a principle of mutual responsibility and 
support, it also emphasizes the issue of “mission creep,” that is, the consumption of 
resources by activities not originally allocated or planned for. 
The British doctrine again makes a distinction between civilian actors, noting that 
there are organizations with whom it is more appropriate to engage primarily through 
liaison complimented by coordinated training-and-awareness activities. About the 
principle of cooperation, the British doctrine gives the impression that, even though 
CIMIC doesn’t imply military control of civil actors, a task force commander may better 
achieve the necessary civil-military relationship through the leadership of the military.  
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4. Application of Civil-Military Cooperation 
NATO: According to the NATO doctrine, the application of CIMIC in Article 5 
collective defense operations is different than in non–Article 5 crisis response operations 
(CRO). The operational stages in both operations are: 
• Preoperational stage 
• Operational stage  
• Transitional stage  
There are some factors particular to civil-military cooperation in both Article 5 
and non–Article 5 operations. For example, in Article 5 operations, an allied joint force 
(AJF) that is deployed in a NATO nation can expect that some CIMIC functions will be 
undertaken by the host nation. But in non–Article 5 operations, NATO forces usually find 
themselves in a situation in which the state institutions have collapsed,, law and order has 
broken down, and there are no institutions to provide CIMIC help to the Alliance forces. 
Another important point, in Article 5 operations the focus is on population movements, 
while in non–Article 5 operations the focus is on shifting the burden of “humanitarian 
assistance” to other regional and international organizations .129  
Great Britain: Unlike NATO’s, Canada’s, and the United States’ doctrines, 
Britain’s does not specify a variety of operation environments, such as combat 
operations, operations other than war, peace support operations, regional conflicts, and 
other combat operations. However, like the other doctrines, it does emphasize that 
CIMIC should be considered at the outset of all planning process, and the process should 
include plans for the handover of tasks to the civil sector, including milestones toward 
that handover .130  
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Canada: Similar to the NATO doctrine, the Canadian doctrine separates the 
application of civil-military cooperation into three stages:131 
• Pre-operational  
• Operational stage  
• Transitional Stage  
However, Canada’s doctrine does not differentiate the operations as “crisis 
response operations” and “collective defense operations” as NATO does. Instead, it 
differentiates the operational environment as; 
• Peace support operations 
• Operations other than war 
• Combat operations 
Also unlike the NATO doctrine, Canada’s doctrine does not prescribe different 
ways of doing CIMIC in different operational environments. 
United States: The U.S. doctrine divides civil-military operations into:132  
• Major regional conflicts 
• Other combat operations 
The doctrine separates the application of civil-military operations into five phases: 





Unlike the NATO doctrine, the U.S. doctrine does not specify phases in the 
different operations: the operational phases are the same, whether they are major regional 
conflicts or other combat operations. 
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5. The Coordination and Use of Civil Resources  
NATO: During a conflict, an important function of civil-military cooperation is 
the use of civilian resources in a balanced way between the military force, the local 
population, and international and nongovernmental organizations. NATO defines those 
procedures and agreements as “civil-military resource coordination (CMRC).”133 
However, the CIMIC staff is not involved in direct management of resources, like the 
drawing up of contracts. The CIMIC role in the coordination of civil resources to execute 
a facilitating, monitoring, and advisory function. It is to ensure a balanced use of 
resources between the military force, the local population, and all civilian organizations 
within the area, so that the commander’s mission can be fulfilled without civilian 
suffering.134 According to the NATO doctrine, the J4 staff is responsible for developing 
host-nation support (HNS) arrangements and making contracts with the host government 
and other organizations and agencies. The CIMIC staff is responsible only for informing 
the J4 staff about the resource capabilities of the host nation. 
Great Britain: The British doctrine does not put special emphasis on the 
coordination of the use of the civilian resources. But it does note that it is the 
responsibility of the J8 staff to ensure a robust mechanism for payment of and accounting 
for funds from internal sources and external organizations. Those require a close working 
relationship with both the CIMIC staff and civilian organizations.135 The British doctrine 
points out that the CIMIC staff should coordinate the following issues concerned with the 
use of civilian resources with J4 logistics.136 
• Host-nation support (HNS ) 
• Use of routes  
• Accounting for the impact of the use of local resources on the population 
• Possible transportation and other resources where necessary to support 
CIMIC tasks 
                                                 
133 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 4-1. 
134 Ibid., 4-2. 
135 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 4-7. 
136 Ibid., 4A-3. 
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Canada: According to the Canadian doctrine, for operations in countries in which 
the provision of support is through ad hoc arrangements, J4 and J5 representatives 
should be among the first to arrive in the area of operation to identify locally available 
support and coordinate their activities for the integration of the possible civilian support 
into the logistic plan. Also, CIMIC personnel should help J4 and J5 personnel in areas 
such as: 
• Existing HNS agreements and arrangements  
• Sources of procurement and resupply of equipment and material  
• Timely availability of resources, particularly for immediate operation 
requirements and unforecasted operational requirements 
• Availability and suitability of specific civilian services related to 
maintenance and logistics  
• Use of the civilian airfield and seaports 
• Medical cooperation 
• Logistics support to military engineer operations 
• Provision of civilian labor 
The Canadian doctrine puts a special emphasis on host-nation support and notes 
that the scope of HNS includes a range of local support in all types of military and 
civilian assistance, particularly logistics and communications. HNS could include: 
• Rear-area security, including vital points  
• Nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) defense 
• Host Nation (HN) civil and military engineer support 
• Deming and explosive ordinance disposal 
• Secure line of communication 
• Provision of living and working accommodations, and logistic facilities 
outside the combat areas 
• Medical support  
• Transport 
• Cargo-handling services 
• Provision of skilled and unskilled labor 
• Storage and security of pre positioned emergency or relief supplies. 
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United States: Similar to the NATO doctrine, the U.S. doctrine notes that, 
although all potential supply sources should be considered for the sources of a mission, 
the military forces should not compete for scarce resources. Unlike the other doctrines, 
the U.S. doctrine points out that, before deployment in an area, military resource planning 
should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel, 
e.g., NGOs and international organizations.137 
According to the NATO doctrine, the contracting support plan is prepared by J4 
personnel. The CIMIC staff helps in necessary data gathering. But according to the U.S. 
doctrine contracting with other organizations is the responsibility of the J8 staff, and civil 
affairs personnel coordinate available data concerning local resources.138 
Civil affairs personnel and logisticians also make plans as to which equipment 
and supplies can be left behind at the completion of a mission, so that those supplies can 
be used for the later reconstruction of the area.139 
Different than the NATO and British doctrines, the  U.S. doctrine explains in a 
very detailed way the issue of “procurement of local national civilian labor” and 
emphasizes that local civilian labor may be used in support of the military operations.27 
As shown above, the Canadian also mentions this topic, but not in depth. 
6. Organization and Command-and-Control of CIMIC/CMO Forces 
NATO: According to the NATO doctrine, the minimum requirement common to 
all situations is CIMIC trained staff who are fully integrated into headquarters at all 
levels.140 The size and structure of the staff will vary from headquarters to headquarters 
and will be mission dependent. These staff may comprise:141 
                                                 
137 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, February 8, 2001, III-20. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 5-1. 
141 Ibid., 5-1, 2. 
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• CIMIC groups142 
• Functional Specialists143 
• General Forces 
The NATO doctrine differentiates the command and control of the CIMIC staff 
between Article 5 and non–Article 5 operations. CIMIC assets in the support of a joint 
operation are normally placed under the operational control of the land forces 
commander.144 Under Article 5 conditions, activities of CIMIC units placed in direct 
support of national formations are coordinated by CIMIC staff at the land-component 
commander level. In non–Article 5 crisis response operations, the requirement is 
normally met by one or more of the following options: 
• The allocation of a CIMIC group under the command and control of the 
allied joint forces (AJF) headquarters (see Table 1). 
• The reinforcement of the CIMIC staff with a headquarters by functional 
specialists or elements from a CIMIC group  
• The procurement of CIMIC assets for deployment in joint operation areas 
(JOA) as part of national contributions to be placed under the command of 
the joint task force.145 
   
 
                                                 
142 CIMIC group is a national or multinational unit composed of CIMIC personnel. CIMIC group may 
be deployed into the joint operation area as part of national contingent or Allied Joint Forces .It may 
comprise Group HQ, a HQ company and a number of CIMIC support companies capable of supporting the 
chain of command throughout the Joint Operation Area, JOA, or region. 




4-Economy and Commerce 
5-Cultural Affairs 
They will be employed for the duration of the specified tasks. These persons may be either military or 
civilian. 
144 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 5-2. 
145 The requirement to fulfill JOA level tasks might then in turn be met by the tasking of national 
assets through the chain of command or of tasking further individual functional specialists who report 
directly to the CIMIC staff. 
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Table 1. Illustrative CIMIC Organizational Structure in a Non–Article 5 Crisis 
Response Operation146 
 
According to the NATO doctrine, commanders below the JFC level may see the 
need to authorize CIMIC activities that do not form a part of the joint task force 
commander’s CIMIC plan. These initiatives are undertaken either by general troops 
within their command and control or by national CIMIC assets147. This is acceptable only 
provided that; 
• These activities are fully transparent and are coordinated at the theatre 
level. 
• They do not compromise the JFTC’s mission 
                                                 
146 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 5-4. 








From the strategic command to the subregional commands, all headquarters 
should include CIMIC trained officers. Nations that contribute to NATO should also have 
CIMIC staff in formations including divisions and brigades.148 
Great Britain: According to the British doctrine, the size and specific 
organization of the joint task force’s CIMIC staff vary depending on the specific mission 
and operational circumstances. Also, the personnel balance between core personnel and 
additional personnel drawn from the CIMIC group will change depending on the 
circumstances. 
Although NATO has civil-military cooperation as a stand-alone J9 function, the 
British doctrine requires that the CIMIC process be embedded within the J3 staff 
functions and be conducted with the normal command chain in order to maintain a 
coherent approach to CIMIC throughout the levels of operation and to achieve the 
necessary operational linkages, particularly with information operations and media 
operations.149 According to the British doctrine, the organic staff may not be specialists; 
they should be trained to understand the principles of CIMIC and complexities of civil 
military cooperation. 
                                                 
148 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 5-6. 




Table 2. Generic CIMIC Cell150 
 
Although CIMIC is not a specialist function, the joint task force may be supported 
by CIMIC advisors, CIMIC teams, functional specialists, liaison officers and 
humanitarian advisors in order to provide for unity of effort. 
CIMIC Advisors: Additional CIMIC -trained staff officers drawn from the Joint 
CIMIC group151 can provide the joint task force input to any civil-military planning 
effort. 
CIMIC Teams: A team of four CIMIC specialists from the joint CIMIC group to 
conduct field assessments of the civil environment, to assist in the establishment of 
CIMIC centers, and to carry out other civil-related tasks. CIMIC teams may be composed 
of civilians, military, or a combination of both. 
                                                 
150 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 4-2. 
151 The term “Civil Affairs Group” was changed to Joint CIMIC Group in mid 2004. 
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Functional specialists: These specialists, who need not be military, will provide 
expert advice and should be called forward when required to meet the specific needs of a 
specific task or activity.152  
Liaison advisor: Liaison officers to civilian organizations may be drawn from the 
joint CIMIC group or from elsewhere within staffs when the necessary level of operation 
of CIMIC principles has been achieved. 
Humanitarian advisor: Humanitarian advisors, drawn from the Department for 
International Development (DFID),153 Department for International Development 
provide the joint task force with specialist advice on the effects of military action on the 
humanitarian sector and how these may be alleviated, thereby enabling commanders to 
make a better informed military judgment.154  
According to the British doctrine,, although CIMIC focus focuses on J3, it is not a 
stand-alone function, Its principles should be applied to the activities of all staff 
branches.155 
 
                                                 
152 Functional specialists can be drawn from the Joint CIMIC Group, but may be also drawn from the 
engineer and Logistic Staff Corps. 
153 British version of U.S. AID. 
154 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 4 -3, 4. 
155 Ibid., 4-5. 
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Table 3. CIMIC Applicability to Staff Branches156 
 
Canada: According to the Canadian doctrine, a civil-military operations section 
is under the J5 CIMIC.157 
                                                 
156 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90 ,Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 4 -5. 
157 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 2-17. 
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Table 4. Civil-Military Cooperation Section158 
 
Under the task force commander’s CIMIC intent and concept of operations, the J5 
CIMIC makes certain  that the military information services are generated by dedicated 
J5 plans, J5 projects, J5 operations, physiological operations (PYSOPS), and public 
affairs, and that they are mutually supportive in civil-military operations.159. Civil-
military operations are planned, coordinated, conducted, supported, and controlled in 
close cooperation and consultation with J1, J2, and J3 plans, J3 ops, J3 engineers, and J4 
and J5 staff officers at the task force headquarters. The J5 CIMIC is responsible for 
organizing and running the civil-military coordination center (CMMC) inside the 
compound area and for setting up CIMIC centers outside the compound area to provide 
civil-military cooperation.160 
 
                                                 
158 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 2-17. 
159 Ibid., 5-1. 
160 Ibid. 
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United States : According to the NATO doctrine, CIMIC personnel are under the 
command and control of the subunits of the joint task force. However, according to the 
U.S. doctrine, civil-military operations may be carried out separately under the title, Joint 
Civil-Military Operations Task Force.49 A joint CMO task force is composed of units 
from more than one military department  of U.S. agency and is formed to carry out civil-
military operations in support of the mission.161 Although such a task force is not a civil 
affairs organization, given their expertise in dealing with NGOs, international 
organizations, and other governmental agencies, a strong representation of civil-affairs-
trained personnel may be required. 
As mentioned, a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) may have 
both conventional forces and special operations forces assigned or attached to support the 
conduct of the civil-military operation. In addition, in rare instances, a JCMOTF could be 
formed as a standing organization, depending on the national command authorities and 
resource availability.162 
Advantages of a joint civil-military operation task force: 
• Consolidated and coordinated civil-military operations  
• Unity of command and effort 
• Allows the joint force command to focus on war fighting, while the 
JCMOTF commander focuses on the civil-military operation and 
transition. 
Disadvantages of a joint civil-military operations task force:163 
• Lack of synchronization between the joint force and  JCMOTF 
Commanders 
• Duplication of effort, if the joint task force is established to conduct civil-
military missions  
• Increased forces, personnel and logistics 
 
 
                                                 
161 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 2-17. 
162 Ibid., 2-20. 








Table 5. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task164 
                                                 
164 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, February 8, 2001, 2-21. 
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Table 6. Possible Joint Task Force Subordinates165 
 
7. Organization CIMIC Responsibilities and Operational CIMIC Tasks 
NATO: In NATO, the Military Committee is the top strategic group providing 
guidance for the conduct of CIMIC as it applies to military operations, exercises, and 
training (see Table 7).166  
 
                                                 
165 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, February 8, 2001, 2-18. 
166 MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on CIMIC. 
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Table 7. NATO’s Civil and Military Structure167 
 
Strategic commanders are responsible for developing, coordinating, and 
updating civil-military cooperation concepts, plans, and procedures, in agreement with 
the guidance of the Military Committee.  
Regional commanders are responsible for standardizing CIMIC skills within 
their areas and establishing HQ CIMIC staff when appointed as a joint force commander. 
Subregional commanders are responsible for providing CIMIC inputs to all 
plans and orders. And, finally, each NATO nation is responsible for developing plans 
and programs in support of NATO civil-military cooperation policy and doctrine. 
In terms of the application of CIMIC, most of the burden falls on the shoulders of 
the theater commander. Some of the main tasks that should be done at the theater level 
are:168 
                                                 
167 NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1110 Brussels – Belgium 2001, 517. 
168 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 6-2. 
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• Advising the commander and staff of the civil conditions in the operation 
area and about how a military operation may affect the civilian population. 
• Ensuring effective communication by preparing reports about the civil 
organizations, attending the meetings of the key organizations, sending 
and receiving liaison officers, and establishing a website on the Internet 
in order to communicate with the organizations and agencies in the 
theater. 
• Providing expertise on the composition of agreements with civilian 
organizations 
Great Britain: According to the British doctrine, CIMIC staff should understand 
the commander’s intentions, any specific directive that is issued by higher authorities, 
such as members of the chief of defense’s staff, and chief-of-joint-operations directives. 
As mentioned before, J3 (Operation planning   officer) is responsible for full CIMIC 
activities. However, the J3 should work in close collaboration with the J8 staff, whose 
responsibility is to ensure a robust mechanism for paying and accounting for funds from 
internal sources and external organizations.169 In the British doctrine there is an emphasis 
on the role of political advisor and the legal aspects of civil military cooperation. The role 
of the political advisor is to give political advise to the commander about the civil 
environment, for this reason CIMIC personnel should have a clear understanding of the 
responsibilities they have that overlap those of the political advisor.170. There must be a 
clear understanding about who is in the lead. The British doctrine emphasizes that legal 
staff should contribute to CIMIC planning, taking into account both the domestic law of 
the nation and international law. 
Canada: According to the Canadian doctrine, the chief of the defense staff, 
assisted by the National Defense Headquarters’ staff (J5 CIMIC, J5 public affairs, J5 
policy what??, J5 legal, J5 Ops, J5 engineer) and J3 staff (J3 plan, J3 Ops, and J3 
engineer), is responsible for establishing broad CIMIC policies based on national 
strategic objectives.58 For a particular operation, the chief-of-defense staff is responsible 
for establishing specific CIMIC policies in accordance with international and domestic 
                                                 
169 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 4-7. 
170 Ibid., 4-8. 
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laws, making sure that the operation plan sufficiently addresses civil-military 
cooperation. 
CIMIC dimension of an operation will affect several divisions of National 
Defense Headquarters, especially the J1, J3, J4, and J5 divisions.171  However, most of 
the burden falls on the J5 division. For example, J5 is responsible for advising the task 
force commander on military requirements for CIMIC activities; for establishing policies 
and principles for coordinating military support to the population and for resource control 
programs; for establishing policies and procedures for the supervision of community 
relations by the task force commander in the area of operation, in collaboration with the 
J4 staff; for coordinating the procurement of the local resources and host-nation support 
for operations; and for establishing CIMIC and civil-military coordination centers. 
Besides this, J3 staff supervise psychological operations (PSYOPS) directed at specific 
target audiences, in close coordination with public-affairs personnel and J5 CIMIC.172 
United States:  According to the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs (JP 3-57.1), 
decision responsibility for civil-affairs (CA) activities starts from the top: the president 
and/or the secretary of defense.173 
Due to their politico-military nature, civil-affairs activities that are carried out by 
the U.S. commanders are directed by policies planned, developed, and disseminated by 
the president and/or the secretary of defense. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is responsible for providing advice to the president and the secretary of defense on the 
employment of civil-affairs He is also responsible for providing guidance to the 
geographic combatant commander for the integration of civil-affairs activities specified 
in the guidance document issued by the secretary of defense. A U.S. Special Operations 
commander is responsible for providing combatant commanders for civil-affairs 
activities from assigned forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to plan and 
conduct civil-affairs activities in support the combatant commander’s mission. A U.S. 
                                                 
171 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 5-15. 
172 Ibid., 5-16. 
173 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, April 14, 2003, III-1. 
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joint force commander is responsible for ensuring that civil-affairs activities are 
properly presented in joint-training exercise scenarios and coordinated with the United 
Special Operations Command for the development of collective training standards related 
to civil affairs. The secretaries of the Military Department are responsible for 
providing for civil affairs in their force structures. The secretary of the army is 
responsible for recruiting, training, organizing, and equipping personnel to meet the civil-
affairs requirement of the U.S. special operations commander and to provide civil-affairs 
requested by the other Department of Defense components. 
Again, much of the burden falls on the shoulders of the joint force commanders, 
because they are responsible for most of the operational tasks. For example, they are 
responsible for planning, integrating, and monitoring the deployment of the available 
civil-affairs in appropriate operational areas, ensuring that all the assigned personnel are 
fully aware of the importance of their actions while in contact with the civilian 
authorities, employing civil affairs  to provide necessary assistance, supplies, and labor 
from indigenous sources. But one of the task force commanders’ most important 
responsibilities is ensuring that staff and organizations within the command have 
enough. Civil-affairs representation with political, legal, cultural, linguistic, and 
economic-related skills to plan and conduct civil-affairs support activities required by the 
plans. They are also responsible for assisting regional friends and allies in planning and 
developing the operational skills and infrastructure to ensure domestic stability through 
civil-affairs activities. 
8. Civilian Dimension of CIMIC  
NATO:  According to NATO, there are three main types of civilian 
organizations:174 These are: 
(1) international organizations (IOs)62  such as the UN High Commissioner’s 
Office for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), and the World Food Program (WFP); (2) Nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), which the NATO doctrine subcategorizes as “Mandated NGOs” 
                                                 
174 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 8-1. 
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and “Non-Mandated NGOs,” based on their recognition by the lead international 
organizations; (3) international and national government donor agencies, such as the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (SAID) and the U.K. Department for 
International Development (DFID); and (4) other groupings, such as (a) civilian 
development agencies whose mandates are to provide technical assistance to developing 
countries and (b) human rights and democratization agencies that seek to protect human 
rights in states where abuses may be rampant. 
NATO’s lead-agency concept indicates that, within the civil dimension of 
CIMIC, a major agency, usually a major UN agency such as UNHCR, will act as a point 
of contact for other agencies in order to coordinate field activities to avoid duplication of 
effort.175  
Great Britain: The British doctrine basically categorizes the civilian 
organizations the same way that the NATO doctrine does. However, it adds some new 
categories, for example:176  
The corporate sector: Multinational business or civil companies and other 
business interests.  
Local authorities: Members of the general populace who hold no formal offices, 
posting, or positions that identify them as representatives of a recognized administration.  
Indigenous civilian leaders: People other than official officeholders who use a 
system of power and influence.  
A resident coordinator and a humanitarian coordinator (HC): According to 
the British doctrine, if a lead agency is not appointed, the UN secretary general appoints a 
humanitarian coordinator to do the all the coordination. The HC may also be the resident 
coordinator (the head of the UN-country team) of another UN official 
Different than the other doctrines, the British doctrine suggests a new idea for the 
overall coordination of the efforts beforehand: holding a “heads of agencies meeting,” to 
                                                 
175 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 8-4. 
176 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 2-3, 4. 
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be chaired by the HC, a lead agency, or a special representative of the secretary general. 
It may include representatives from all the UN agencies, international organizations for 
migration, and NGOs, with the ICRC and also the joint task force commander having 
observer status. However, in the doctrine there is no detailed information about how this 
idea can be realized in practice.  
Canada: The Canadian doctrine indicates that a stakeholder will analyze civil-
military operations, in terms of the civilian side of the players, and comes up with the 
principle that “Each stakeholder has a mandate, capability, and limitation, which must be 
discussed and understood by the task force commander and his staff in the context of 
planning coordination, conduct monitoring, and control of the civil phase of a military 
operation”177 These civilian stakeholders are civil authorities and members of the 
population, politicians and diplomats, civilian police, international humanitarian 
organizations, human rights and democratization agencies, international development 
agencies, members of the media, the UN, and NGOs. 
Lead Agency: The Canadian doctrine notes that, under the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it is the lead humanitarian agencies that 
strengthen coordination between the humanitarian players. The doctrine also emphasizes 
that, even though . . . area of the operation, the Canadian armed forces will never be 
placed under the command and control of any civilian organization, but they will support 
and assist civil-military cooperation activities.178  
United States: The U.S. doctrine does not draw clear lines between civilian 
organizations and agencies according to their types. However, it emphasizes the unique 
status of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).179 The doctrine also 
states that the proliferation of unfocused, unsuitable NGOs may be controlled through an 
accreditation process involving the NGO, the host country, and the lead UN emergency 
organization. As a principle, the U.S. doctrine accepts that, in many modern emergencies, 
                                                 
177 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 2-4. 
178 Ibid., 2-15. 
179 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, April 14, 2003, VII-34. 
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civilian tasks constitute the main operational effort and military tasks are in support of 
this main effort. For this reason, the military should be a part of the civilian initiative, 
instead of leading them, because civilian agencies possess cooperative operational 
advantages for emergency relief work, and because military costs average ten times the 
cost for civilian agencies to perform the same relief function.180 
Due to the excessive independent action on the part of some NGOs, there can be 
problems in terms of coordination. In those cases, the U.S. doctrine suggests that the 
military solve the problems through direct contact with the lead international organization 
or with the national governments (both donor and host), rather than correcting the 
offending NGOs directly.181 On the issue of information-sharing between military and 
civilian organizations, the U.S. doctrine notes that, while some international 
organizations and NGOs may be reluctant to share vital information with the military, 
“out of their concern for impartiality and neutrality,” it is worth attempting, to develop a 
climate of respect and trust to facilitate such exchanges.182  
In terms of civil-military coordination, the U.S. doctrine comes up with a new 
concept: functional coordinating groups.183 Due to the excessive and diversified 
amount of NGOs and civilian organizations with different mandates, the U.S. doctrine 
suggests that functional coordinating groups may be formed for each of the functional 
civil-sector areas. Further subgroups may be formed to coordinate a specific issue or 
project. For example, a group coordinating infrastructure repair may have a separate 
working group for just the reopening of an airport. Coordinating groups may be formed,  
for example, to work on such issues as: governance, civil security, humanitarian efforts, 
the economy and commerce, social and cultural issues, sources of information, and the 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
180 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, February 8, 2001, IV-6. 
181 Ibid., IV-7. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid., IV-8. 
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Lead agencies: Like the NATO doctrine, the U.S. doctrine emphasizes the 
importance of a lead agency that will be designated usually by the UN. It suggests 
contacting the headquarters of that agency, usually in Geneva if it is a UN department, 
prior to arrival in the country.184  In addition, the U.S. doctrine stresses the necessity of 
designating a lead government agency to ensure coordination among the various agencies 
of the U.S. government in compliance with Presidential Decision Directive 56, concerned 
with “Managing Complex Emergencies.”185  
9. Civil-Military Cooperation Centers, Civil-Military Coordination 
Centers, and Civil-Military Operations 
NATO: The NATO doctrine defines CIMIC centers as locations where an 
exchange of information between military personnel, civilian organizations, and the local 
authorities and population takes place.186 The centers are usually located “outside the 
wire,” close to the lead or major agencies. If NATO forces enter a conflict area after the 
arrival of the main international and nongovernmental organizations, there may already 
be a center that acts as a coordination center. In those cases, the NATO doctrine 
emphasizes that NATO forces should then work with that center. It also notes that CIMIC 
centers, in addition to coordinating civil-military relations, reinforce the legitimacy of the 
NATO forces in the eyes of civil authorities and the local population.187 
Great Britain: In addition to CIMIC centers, also mentioned in the NATO 
doctrine, the British doctrine emphasizes the importance of a similar facility, a civil-
military operations center (CMOC). A CMOC is a place that CIMIC staff, at the 
operational level, establishes in order to interface and coordinate CIMIC activities with 
governmental agencies, IOs, and NGOs. However, unlike CIMIC centers, a CMOC is not 
open to the public.188 
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186 Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, 5-3. 
187 Ibid., 5-4. 
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Canada:  CIMIC centers: According to the Canadian doctrine, CIMIC centers 
are subordinate to the civil-military coordination centers, centers similar to the British 
CMOC. At least one CIMIC center should be located with the lead agency, away from 
military establishments, to provide information on the tactical situation in the area of 
operation. The CIMIC centers are composed of a commander, an operating officer, an 
administrative/ logistics officer, and representatives from the military, civilian agencies, 
and specialist fields. Other than the task concerning coordination with civilian agencies 
and organizations and the local populace, CIMIC centers also perform such tasks as:189 
• Facilitating the transparency of civil-military operations and support to the 
civil administration in the area of operation among all stakeholders 
through the media and public-affairs efforts and briefings. 
• Providing updated minefield maps and routes, useful information on issues 
such as mine awareness and the general situation in an area of operation, 
security issues, and an evacuation plan. 
• Providing information to J5 operatives for the preparation of CIMIC 
reports and periodic commander’s assessment reports. 
Civil-Military Coordination Centers (CMCC):  According to the Canadian 
doctrine, the main purpose of the CMCC is to provide the task force commander a secure 
area to coordinate activities and discuss classified matters with the heads of IOs, NGOs, 
and UN agencies, and sometimes, with local leaders.77 If the CIMIC activities are 
extensive in the area of operation, the task force commander can split the CMCC into two 
levels: 
• A current-operations group led by the J5 for civil-military cooperation, 
focused on short-term planning. 
• A steering group led by the deputy commander or the chiefs of staff, to 
provide long- term policy. 
The head of the CMCC, the J5, advises the task force commander on civil-
military matters, the J3 is responsible for supervising the J5 CMCC staff with CIMIC 
experience and training. That staff could be composed of J5 operatives, J5 plans/projects 
personnel, J5 health services support, a J5 veterinarian, J5 administration/finance 
personnel, and a PSYOPS cell, in addition to the heads of key humanitarian organizations 
                                                 
189 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 5-8, 9. 
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the area of operation to assist J5 CIMIC. However, the logistic and movement 
coordination remains with the J4 staff. The composition of a CMCC differs from 
operation to operation, depending on the scope of civil tasks to be performed. According 
to the Canadian doctrine, the organization and operation of CMCC will include:190 
• Reception 
• Staff: All military staff and specialists such as legal, policy, public affairs, 
CIMIC, and PSYOPS, including representatives of main civil agencies 
should be represented in the CMCC. The Canadian doctrine suggests that, 
to prevent duplication of effort, it would be very helpful and useful for the 
CMCC to develop a coordination matrix to identify who will do what. 





Table 8. Notional Force Level of a Civil-Military Coordination Center191 
 
                                                 
190 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 5-8. 
191 Ibid., 5E-1. 
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United States:  In the American sense, a civil-military operations center (CMOC) 
acts more like a CIMIC center than a CMOC in the British sense. According to the U.S. 
doctrine, CMOC functions include the functions of both a CIMIC center and a CMO 
center, because the location of a CMOC can be  either within the security perimeter of the 
supported military headquarters or outside of it.192 The officer in charge of a CMOC 
reports to the civil-military operations officer on the J3 staff. The United States has a 
different concept in terms of civil-military coordination: the United States uses a civil-
military coordination board to coordinate the activities at the headquarters.193 
 
  
Table 9. Basic Civil-Military Operation Center Structure  
 
                                                 
192 CMOC Handbook, United States Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 
2002, 2-5. 




Table 10. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements necessary to 
Establish a Brigade CMOC 
 
C. EVALUATION OF THE COMPARISON 
 





U.S.: Force Protection;Liaison;Limited Direct Support
U.K.: CIMIC by conventional troops 
Canada: Systems Approach 
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NATO:  According to the NATO doctrine, cooperation with a potentially wide 
range of civilian bodies should not compromise the overall mission.194 
Great Britain:  The British doctrine states that, during the application of CIMIC, 
the adaptability of the forces to a changing situation is one of the most important 
issues.195  
Canada:  Canadians approach CIMIC using a systems approach, in which they 
focus on dynamic interrelationships between the international community system and its 
environment.196  
United States:  While the NATO, British, and Canadian doctrines of CIMIC are a 
part of their overall operations plans and should not be perceived out of the context of 
their military strategies, the U.S. doctrine does not confine civil-military operations to the 
military strategy. The United States sees CMO as a part of its overall national strategy, 
formulated and managed through interagency and multinational coordination and 
integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical-level plans and operations.197 
                                                 
194 U.S. Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, April 14, 2003, 1-2. 
195 Great Britain Interim Joint Publication 3-90, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 
2003, 4-1. 
196 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, Canadian Chief of the Defence 
Staff, January 1999, 1-27. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In the light of the CIMIC lessons learned from Kosovo and Bosnia, and doctrine 
comparison, this chapter makes recommendations to the Turkish Armed Forces in its 
effort for developing a new CIMIC doctrine.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter makes recommendations to the Turkish Armed Forces in its effort 
for developing a new CIMIC doctrine in light of the CIMIC lessons learned from Kosovo 
and Bosnia, and after comparing NATO doctrines. 
• When the specific situation of Turkey is taken into account; Turkish 
Armed Forces should study CIMIC in four scenarios; 
• CIMIC in combat operations, 
• CIMIC in peacekeeping operations, 
• CIMIC in homeland security operations, 
• CIMIC in crisis management (e.g., natural disaster). 
As mentioned in the NATO doctrine, CIMIC core functions should be; 
• Support to the military force,  
• Support to the civil environment and,  
• Civil military liaison. 
However, CIMIC training for support to the civil environment in homeland 
security operations (e.g., counterinsurgency operations) should be different than the other 




Figure 10.   Core Functions of CIMIC 
 
Based on the four possible scenarios mentioned above, associated CIMIC 
activities can be  
• Military assistance in humanitarian relief activities  
• Military assistance to the internally displaced persons in homeland 
security operations 
• Military assistance to the refugees in crisis ,combat and peace operations 
• Host nation support in peace operations 
• Civil defense and security in combat operations and peace operations 
• Civic activities in  homeland security and peace operations 
• Population and resource control in combat ,peace and homeland security 
operations 
• Civil administration in hostile territory in combat and peace operations 
• Disaster assistance in crisis management 
CIMIC
Support to the 
Military Force 





Figure 11.   Associated CIMIC Activities in Different Scenarios 
 
According to the lessons learned in Kosovo and Bosnia and CIMIC doctrines 
comparison, guiding CIMIC principles should be 
• Cultural awareness, 
• Strategic planning that includes all sub units  
• Prioritization and concentration of efforts and effective use of  resources 
• Consent of the civilians 
• Transparency of the CIMIC activities 
• Communication  
• Legal obligation 
• Impartiality 
Application of CIMIC should be different in combat operations, peace operations 
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Host Nation Support  
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Associated CIMIC Activities Scenarios 
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liaisons between military forces and civilian environment, in combat operations the focus 
should be on decreasing the interference of civilian population with the military forces on 
the battle field. And in homeland security operations the focus should be on public affairs 
and psychological operations (PSYOP)  
During the peace operations J4 Logistics staff should be responsible for 
coordinating the use of civil resources and drawing up contracts in the host country. J5 
CIMIC should help J4 staff in identifying locally available support and coordinate their 
activities for the integration of possible civilian support into the logistic plan. However it 
should be remembered as a principle that military forces should not compete for scarce 
resources of the host country. J4 and J5 should coordinate; 
• Host Nation Support, 
• Security of vital  places 
• Nuclear-Biological –Chemical (NBC) defense 
• Secure line of communication 
• Provision of skilled and unskilled labor 
• Provision of living and working accommodations, and logistic 
facilities outside the combat areas. 
• Use of transportation facilities like, railways, airfields and seaports where 
necessary to support CIMIC tasks 
• Availability and suitability of specific civilian services related to 
maintenance and logistics. 
• Medical support to civilian population , 
• Provision of living and working facilities outside the combat area, 
• Custom issues and cargo handling services for peacekeeping troops. 
At least one CIMIC trained staff should be designated to all levels of headquarters 
down to battalion level. In some cases commanders may need to authorize CIMIC 
activities, which is not a part of the general CIMIC plan. However, these activities are 
acceptable only if they do not conflict with the Joint Task Force Commander’s intent. 
Turkey should establish an active “CIMIC Group “in order to provide personnel 
for the CIMIC units and this CIMIC group should be under command and control of 
special forces civil military cooperation regiment. Because Turkey has still conscription 
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system as the source of its military personnel it should review their skill profiles and 
select candidates who meet their CIMIC functional specialist needs and then canalize the 
civilians with specific expertise to this CIMIC group. Those areas of expertise should be; 
public administration, general law, preventive medication, fire fighting, emergency health 
service, unemployment, transportation, water systems, electrical systems, infrastructure, 
humanitarian relief, food and agriculture, industry, religion, language and regional 
expertise. Officers and non commissioned officers who will be employed in CIMIC 
group should be fluent at least in English and if possible they should be encouraged to 
learn Balkan languages and Arabic. CIMIC units pass through a very good CIMIC 
training. The training should include; 
• Communication and consensus building methods, 
• Ethics in low-context and high context cultures, 
• General information about the religions, 
• Information technology,  
• Damage assessment techniques , 
• Relations with the personnel of non governmental and international 
organizations, 
• First aid in medical emergency situations, 
• Geneva Convention related to the protection of human rights 
When designated, at the battalion level, CIMIC units should be under J3 section, 
however at the higher level headquarters CIMIC should be a stand alone function under 
J9, like in NATO. 
The number of CIMIC units which will be sent to the battalions should be 
proportionate with the number of the companies working under command and control of 
the battalion. Beside the CIMIC units who will work on the field, a CIMIC headquarter in 
command of and experienced CIMIC officer should coordinate the activities of the units 
on the ground  with the other  staff in the battalion headquarter according to the intent of 
the battalion commander. 
J9 (civil military cooperation section) of the Turkish Joint Chief of Staff 
Headquarter should be the top strategic place to provide guidance for the conduct of 
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CIMIC as it applies to the military operations. However, chief of that section should in 
close coordination with Ministry of Foreign Affairs in peacekeeping operations, and 
Ministry of Interior Affairs in homeland security operations and in natural disasters.  
Lead agency during the homeland security operations should be the Department 
of Public Relations at the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the lead agency during the 
natural disasters should be the Center of Crisis Management under the prime minister. 
At the battalion level there should be a civil military coordination center (CMCC) 
and a civil military cooperation center (CIMIC Center). CMCC should be inside the 
secure military zone to coordinate activities and discuss classified matters with the heads 
of IOs, NGOs and UN agencies and sometimes with local leaders. CIMIC  centers should 
be located  near the lead agency and away from military establishments to provide 
civilian agencies and local population with information about mine field maps and routes, 
useful information on issues such as mine awareness and general situation in area of 
operation security issues and the evacuation plans CIMIC centers should also facilitate 
the transparency of the activities of the CIMIC units and they should support  civil 
administration in the area of operation through media and public affairs efforts and 
briefings.  CIMIC activities do not usually arouse media interests, however, they should 
be publicized effectively. 
CIMIC units should write fill out a daily report in order to give feedback for the 
future activities. Besides this, head of the CIMIC units at the battalion level should also 
record the lessons learned according to the reports gathered by the field CIMIC units. 
During the peace operations, rotation times for the CIMIC personnel in the same 
unit should be different so that the turnover can be utilized more effectively and rotation 
times for those personnel should be more at least nine months. Besides this, rotations 
should overlap each other for at least two weeks. 
B. ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED  
In addition to the issues mentioned in the NATO CIMIC doctrine, new Turkish 
CIMIC doctrine should also address the following issues; 
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• The role of CIMIC in counterinsurgency, 
• How should CIMIC activities be carried out in non -NATO multinational 
peacekeeping operations? 
• How should CIMIC personnel be trained? 
• At the strategic level how should official agencies coordinate their CIMIC 
activities? 
• Who should coordinate the funding issues in case of an interagency 
cooperation? 
• Should the CIMIC units have their own equipment to carry out their 
missions or should they use the military equipment normally designated 
for combat mission? Should the military equipment be used for CIMIC, if 
they are idle? 
• What should be the exact role of Special Forces civil military cooperation 
regiment in CIMIC? 
• Force protection of the CIMIC units, 
• How should the non-commissioned officers be used more effectively in 
CIMIC? 
• How should the interactions between CIMIC units and locals leaders be? 
• How should the classification of information be? 
• What should be the roles of local educated people in CIMIC during 
peacekeeping operations? 
• What should CIMIC personnel do to protect their impartiality? 
• This thesis is intended to contribute to the Turkish armed forces’ 
development of a national doctrine for civil-military cooperation 
(CIMIC).However it does not cover all issues that ought to be addressed in 
doctrine development. Further studies should focus on other applications 
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